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CALIFORNIA'S EXPANSION OF THE PARENTAL
RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS:
ADOPTION OF KELSEY S.,
823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992)
Traditionally, unwed fathers have had fewer rights with regard to
their children than either unmarried mothers or parents who have been
married.' Over the past two decades, unwed fathers have used the
Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the automatic termination of
their parental rights when their children's mothers place their children
up for adoption.2 The Supreme Court has found that an unwed father
has a right to constitutional protection of his parental rights when he
has established a "substantial relationship" with his child.3 The
Supreme Court, however, has not addressed whether a mother may
unilaterally preclude a father from exercising his parental rights by
preventing the father from forming such a substantial relationship with
the child.4 In Adoption of Kelsey S. ,- the California Supreme Court
resolved this issue for the State of California. The court found that a
state statute violated an unwed biological father's due process and
equal protection rights by allowing the child's mother to unilaterally
1. Kara L. Boucher & Ruthann M. Macolini, The Parental Rights of Unwed Fa-
thers: A Developmental Perspective, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 45, 45-46 (1992) (explaining
that, while fathers of legitimate children have increasingly been successful in custody
disputes, fathers of illegitimate children continue to have few rights).
2. See infra notes 26-49 and accompanying text for discussion of Supreme Court
cases addressing unwed fathers' constitutional right to protect their parental interest.
3. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-58 (1972) (holding that a court may not
remove a child from the custody of his unwed father absent a finding of the father's
unfitness as a parent). After the Supreme Court recognized the rights of unwed fathers,
both state legislatures and courts have focused on the relationship between an unwed
father and his child to determine the degree of constitutional protection the father's
rights are due. Boucher & Macolini, supra note 1, at 49.
4. This question affects a significant number of unwed fathers. The United States
Census Bureau recently issued "Fertility of American Women," wherein it reported
that, in the latest statistical year (July 1989 to June 1990), 913,000 of 3.9 million births,
or 1 in 4, were by unwed mothers. See Robert Pear, Larger Number of New Mothers
Are Unmarried, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1991, at A20.
5. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
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hinder the father from acquiring "presumed father" status, thereby al-
lowing the state to terminate the father's rights without a hearing as to
his fitness as a parent.6
In Kelsey, an unwed mother placed her newborn baby up for adop-
tion.7 The child's biological father petitioned the court to establish his
parental relationship and to obtain custody.8 The prospective adoptive
parents filed an adoption petition to terminate the father's rights.9 Be-
cause the father did not have "presumed" status,10 the potential adop-
tive parents claimed that the court only needed the child's mother's
consent.'1 The trial court terminated the father's parental rights and
permitted the adoption with only the consent of the child's mother.12
The court found that the father was not the child's presumed father
under California law and that termination of his parental rights and
adoption of the child was in the child's best interest. 3 The court of
6. Id. at 1236.
7. Id. at 1217.
8. Id. at 1217-18. The biological father objected to the mother's decision to place
their child up for adoption. Id. at 1217. The same day the biological father petitioned
to establish his parental rights and gain custody, the court granted the unwed father
temporary custody of the child and stayed all adoption proceedings. Id. at 1218. Be-
cause the father was unsuccessful in serving the court order on the adoptive parents, the
adoptive parents ignored the order. Id. The father never received actual temporary
custody of the child. The court later modified the custody award and granted tempo-
rary custody to the child's mother. Id.
9. 823 P.2d at 1218.
10. Under California law, whether a biological father qualifies as a "presumed fa-
ther" is essential in determining his parental rights. A man may be the undisputed
biological father of a child, but may nevertheless fail to meet the requirements of "pre-
sumed" status. Id. A man may become a "presumed father" if "[h]e receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Id. at 1220 (citing
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992)). Mothers and presumed fa-
thers have far greater rights than natural fathers because, except under specified circum-
stances, California law permits either a mother or a presumed father to withhold
consent to the adoption of his or her child. Id. at 1219 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 221.20
(West Supp. 1992)). In fact, a mother or presumed father must consent to an adoption
unless there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to
care for the child. Id. On the other hand, a natural father's consent is not necessary
unless the father convinces the court that retention of his parental rights would be in the
best interest of the child. Id. The child's best interest is not a consideration with regard
to a presumed father or mother. Id.
11. 823 P.2d at 1218.
12. Adoption of Kelsey, 266 Cal. Rptr. 760, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
13. Id. The court came to this conclusion by using a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Id.
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appeals affirmed14 and held that a natural father who never took cus-
tody of his child, despite attempts to fulfill his parental responsibilities,
does not have a constitutional right to veto an adoption to which the
mother consented.15
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded.16
The court found that the statutory scheme, which allows a mother to
preclude her child's father from gaining presumed father status and the
concomitant right to withhold consent to the child's adoption, violated
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.
17
Historically, states considered illegitimate children to be the children
of only their mothers while unwed fathers had no parental rights.1 8
Over the past twenty years, however, courts have explored the rights of
unwed fathers.19 Several Supreme Court cases have acknowledged that
the Constitution protects unwed fathers' parental rights.20 The
Supreme Court has held that the existence and quality of a father's
relationship with his child is relevant in determining when the court
may terminate a father's parental rights without the father's consent.21
Because state law governs the realm of family law, there is a lack of
14. Id. at 766.
15. Id. at 763-64.
16. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1237-38. On remand, the court is to
consider the father's conduct "throughout the period since he learned he was the biolog-
ical father, including his conduct during the pendency of [the] legal proceeding," in
order to determine whether he demonstrates the required commitment to his parental
responsibilities. Id. at 1237.
17. Id. at 1236.
18. See Boucher & Macolini, supra note 1, at 45-46 (noting that legitimate children
were normally treated as property of their fathers throughout history, while illegitimate
children have begun to be considered children of strictly the mother).
19. See Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1166-77 (D.C. 1990) (analyzing the notice
due to an unwed father under the due process clause and his opportunity interest in
custody); Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P.2d 894, 898 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
due process requires that the natural father of an illegitimate child have a paramount
right over nonparents, unless the court finds the natural father to be unfit); Adoption of
N., 673 P.2d 864, 867-68 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that only those unwed fathers who
demonstrate commitment to their parental responsibilities have parental rights pro-
tected under the due process clause).
20. For an overview of the history of Supreme Court cases addressing the constitu-
tional protection of unwed fathers' parental rights, see Boucher & Macolini, supra note
1, at 45-49.
21. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1977) (finding that the lower
court did not violate an unwed father's due process or equal protection rights by termi-
nating his parental interests without his consent when the father had never taken any
significant responsibility for his child).
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uniformity among the states as to the level of constitutional protection
available to unwed fathers who wish to maintain their parental
rights.22 Some state courts inquire predominantly into the relationship
between the father and the child.23 Other courts focus primarily on
whether the father provides financial support to the child.24 In recent
years, courts have expanded the parental rights of unmarried fathers by
focusing on their rights under the Constitution.25
In Stanley v. Illinois,26 the Supreme Court analyzed the issue of an
unwed father's constitutional rights for the first time. The Court found
that an Illinois statute, which declared the children of an unwed father
to be dependents of the state upon the mother's death, without a hear-
ing as to the father's parental fitness, violated both the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.27 The Stanley Court
22. See Boucher & Macolini, supra note 1, at 50. States have different requirements
as to the notice and consent required in terminating an unwed father's rights. Some
states only require consent and notice or both after a father has acknowledged his child.
See, eg., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.092 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 435, 441 (Supp.
1991). Some states require notice of adoption proceedings to unwed fathers in some
circumstances, but do not require their consent for adoption. See, ag., ALA. CODE
§ 26-10-3 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-206, 9-9-207, 9-9-224 (1991). Other states
provide for consent but not notice. See, e-g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (1990)
(with some exceptions); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 142, 143 (1990).
23. Boucher & Macolini, supra note 1, at 50-51 (noting the focus of many state
statutes and concluding that "[c]ourts tend to become engaged in evaluating the nature
of the relationship between father and child, either through explicit statutory language
or constitutional challenge to the statute").
24. See In re Horbatenko, 531 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (concluding
that the court acted appropriately in examining an unwed father's employment and
financial status during custody proceedings); In re Adoption of R.G.C., 742 P.2d 471,
473 (Mont. 1987) (holding that the court did not need an unwed father's consent for
adoption when the father had not provided support to the child); In re Adoption of
Strawser, 522 N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio App. 1987) (holding that an unwed father's failure to
support his child prevented him from constitutional protection of his parental rights).
25. In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462-63 (Ga. 1987) (concluding that an
unmarried father has an opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his child
which is constitutionally protected, and therefore, unless he abandons that interest, he is
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before a court terminates his parental
rights); In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545, 550-51 (La. 1990) (holding that an
unwed father of a newborn child who demonstrates a full commitment to the responsi-
bilities of a parent has a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining his parental
rights).
26. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
27. Id. at 657-58. The Court noted that a father's interest in retaining custody of
his children is substantial. Id. at 651. The Court found that the State had an asserted
interest in protecting the well-being of illegitimate children. Id. at 652. It explained
that removing children from the custody of their father without a hearing to determine
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held that the State could not presume that unwed fathers were unfit
parents.2" Instead, the Court reasoned, due process required that pa-
rental fitness be judged on an individualized basis.29 To deny the un-
wed fathers a hearing granted to all other parents violated equal
protection.30
The Supreme Court clarified and limited the Stanley decision in
Quilloin v. Walcott.31 In Quilloin, the Court held that a father did not
have a constitutional right to veto the adoption of his eleven year old
child when he had never exercised actual or legal custody of the
child.32 The Court upheld a Georgia statute,33 which provided that a
court did not need the consent of an unwed father for the child's adop-
tion absent legitimation of the child. 3' The Court found that, because
the father did not regularly contribute to the upbringing of his child,
the "best interests of the child" was the main inquiry in the adoption
proceedings, not the "fitness" of the unwed father.3 Additionally, the
whether the father is fit to be a parent to the child does not serve the State's interest. Id.
at 657-58. Removing a child from the care of a fit parent, in fact, directly contradicts
the goal. Thus, the Court held that the State may not constitutionally remove a child
from the custody of his unwed father absent a showing of his parental unfitness. Id. at
658.
28. 405 U.S. at 657-58.
29. Id. at 649-58.
30. Id. at 658.
31. 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
32. Id. at 255-56. The unwed father never petitioned to legitimate his son at any
time during the 1 I years between the time the child was born and the time its mother's
second husband filed to adopt the child. Id. at 249. In fact, even after the mother's
second husband filed a petition for adoption, the child's biological father never peti-
tioned for custody. Id. The biological father's sole reaction was to file for visiting
rights, to petition for legitimation, and to file an objection to the adoption. Id. at 249-
50.
33. Under the Georgia statute, the courts would not permit the adoption of a child
born to married parents without the consent of each living parent unless one parent had
voluntarily surrendered his or her parental rights or had been found unfit. 434 U.S. at
248. In contrast, the law applicable to the adoption of children born out of wedlock
required the consent of only the child's mother. Id. An unwed father could only veto
the adoption of his child when he had "legitimated" the child by either marrying the
mother or obtaining a court order. Id. at 249.
34. Id. at 254-255. The Court reiterated that the Constitution protects the relation-
ship between parent and child. Id. at 255. However, the Court found that because the
father never had custody of his child, he was not entitled to the right to veto the adop-
tion of his child by the child's mother's husband with whom the child had lived for
several years. Id.
35. Quilloin, 434 U.S. 254-56. The biological father argued that Georgia's statute
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Court found that the Georgia Code's distinction in treatment between
unwed fathers and divorced fathers did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36
The Supreme Court further defined the extent of constitutional pro-
tection available to unwed fathers in Caban v. Mohammed.37 In
Caban, an unwed father objected to the adoption of his minor children,
with whom he had frequent contact, by the mother's husband.38 The
Caban Court held that a New York statute, which did not require an
unwed father's consent for the adoption of his child, but did require the
consent of an unwed mother or a married parent, violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9 The Court found that the State had no substan-
tial interest in distinguishing between unmarried mothers and
unmarried fathers. 4° The Court stated in dictum, however, that noth-
violated his due process rights by terminating his parental rights without a fitness hear-
ing, while terminating the rights of unwed mothers only upon consent. Id. at 253. The
Court found that because the father never sought custody of the child, the fitness of the
father was irrelevant, and the Court only needed to consider the best interest of the
child. Id. at 255.
36. Id. at 256. The unwed father contended that he should have the same authority
to veto the adoption of his child as that of a divorced father no longer living with his
child. Id. at 255-56. In rejecting his claim, the Court found a significant difference
between the parental commitment of the biological father in Quilloin and that of di-
vorced fathers. Id. at 256. Whereas divorced or separated fathers lived with their chil-
dren at one time, Quilloin never had custody of his child. Id. Because he had never
taken on the responsibilities with regard to the care of his child, the Court found that
the State could grant fewer rights to unwed fathers who are similarly uncommitted than
to divorced fathers. Id.
37. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
38. Id. at 382-83. The unwed father lived with his children and their mother for
several years. Id. at 382. When his relationship with the children's mother ended, he
continued to contribute to the children's support. The father visited his children regu-
larly until they moved with their grandmother to Puerto Rico, and then continued to
communicate with them on a regular basis. Later, each of the biological parents and
their new spouses petitioned for custody of the children. Id. at 382-83.
39. 441 U.S. at 394. The Court found that the New York statute treated unwed
parents differently according to their sex. Id. at 385-88. Unmarried mothers could
withhold consent to the adoption of their children, while unwed fathers, no matter how
significant their relationship with their children, could only prevent the termination of
their parental rights by showing that the adoption would not serve their children's best
interests. Id. at 387-88.
40. The Court rejected the argument that a closer bond between mother and child
in infancy warrants a distinction at all stages of the child's life. Id. at 388-89. Further,
the Court found that the law did not bear a substantial relationship to the state's inter-
est in facilitating the adoption of illegitimate children. Id. at 391. Finally, the Court
found that, while the difficulty of locating unwed fathers may warrant a distinction
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ing in the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from allowing the
adoption of a child without the consent of an unwed father who has not
participated in rearing the child.4 1
The Supreme Court expanded the rights of unwed fathers in Lehr v.
Robertson .42 The Court held that a New York statute's43 disparate
treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers who had never
shouldered any significant responsibility for their children did not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court found that an unwed
father has a constitutionally protected "opportunity interest"" in
forming a relationship with his newborn child.46 The constitutional
protection is available, however, only if the unwed father acts in a
timely manner to establish a relationship with his child.47  Addition-
ally, the Constitution protects the unwed father's parental rights only
to the extent that the unwed father is willing to assume responsibility
for his child.48 Because the father in Lehr, like the father in Quilloin,
between unwed mothers and fathers during the child's infancy, beyond infancy such a
distinction is no longer necessary. Id. at 392.
41. Id.
42. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
43. The Court found that the New York statutory scheme at issue adequately pro-
tected the parental rights of unwed fathers. Id. at 264-65 (construing N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §§ 11 l-a(2), I 1 -a(3) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-83)). The statute required
that notice of a child's adoption be given to several categories of fathers, including those
fathers who had listed their names on the putative father registry, those who had been
adjudicated to be the father, those listed on the child's birth certificate as the father,
those who live with the child and the child's mother and who hold themselves out to be
the father, those identified as the father by the mother in a sworn statement, and those
fathers married to the child's mother before the child was six months old. Id. at 250-51.
No notice is required to those who do not qualify under the listed categories. Id.
44. Id. at 267-68. The unwed father in Lehr had never had any meaningful rela-
tionship with his daughter. Id. at 267. He did not provide financial, custodial, or per-
sonal support, nor did he seek to establish a legal tie to his child until two years after her
birth. Id. at 262. The unwed father claimed that the termination of his parental rights
with no notice to him or consent by him violated his due process and equal protection
rights. Id. at 250.
45. The Court defined an opportunity interest as the right of a biological parent to
form a substantial relationship with his or her child. 463 U.S. at 262.
46. Id. The Court recognized the unique relationship between a parent and child
and explained that the biological connection for an unwed father is significant in that it
offers the biological father an opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. Id.
47. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. The Court found that the father had never established a
custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his daughter. Id.
48. Id. The Court held that if a father grasps the opportunity and accepts some
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the parent-child relationship. Id. If a
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never established a substantial relationship with his child, the Court
found that the New York statute at issue did not deny the father due
process or equal protection. 9
The Supreme Court left unresolved the issue of whether a mother
may unilaterally prevent a father from forming a substantial relation-
ship with the child and thereby totally vitiate possibilities of his paren-
tal rights being protected.50 State courts addressing the issue have been
sympathetic to unwed fathers.51 For example, in In re Raquel Marie
X. ,52 the Court of Appeals of New York extended the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Lehr, 3 thereby granting significant protection to unwed
fathers who wished to prevent the termination of their parental
rights.54 The court acknowledged that an unwed father of a newborn,
father fails to do so, "the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to
listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie." Id.
49. Id. at 263-68. The Court rejected the unwed father's due process claim and
explained that the New York statutes adequately protected the father's interest in estab-
lishing a relationship with his child. Id. at 265. The father could have developed a
relationship with his child or could have registered as a putative father to protect his
parental rights. Id. at 264-65.
The Court denied the unwed father's equal protection claim using the same analysis it
employed in Quilloin. Id. at 267. The Court found that when one parent had continu-
ous custody of a child and the other parent either abandoned the child or never formed
a relationship with the child, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from
assigning the two parents different legal rights. Id. at 267-68.
50. For discussion of the many questions left unanswered by the Lehr decision, see
Laurel J. Eveleigh, Certainly Not Child's Play: A Serious Game of Hide and Seek with
the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1055, 1069 (1989). Eveleigh cites
the following examples of these unresolved issues: what the unwed father must do to
assert his opportunity interest in his infant child; what the state must do to promote its
interest in facilitating adoption of children while still protecting unwed father's rights;
and the appropriate standard of review that courts should apply in custody contests
between unwed fathers and the state. Id.
51. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987) (concluding that
unwed fathers have an opportunity interest protected by due process of law and that if
the unwed father promptly pursues this interest, the court may not terminate his paren-
tal rights absent a showing of unfitness); In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545 (La.
1990) (holding that when an unwed father of a newborn child demonstrates a full com-
mitment to the responsibilities of being a father, he has a constitutionally protected
interest in the child).
52. 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). For a thorough analysis of the Raquel
case, see Recent Development, 104 HARV. L. REV. 800, 800-07 (1991).
53. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for discussion of the Lehr case.
54. Raquel, 559 N.E.2d at 425. The court declared a New York law unconstitu-
tional because the statute required that an unwed father live with the mother before he
will have a right to veto the adoption of his child. Id. at 426. See infra note 58 for the
statutory language. The court also established criteria by which courts should judge an
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with whom he has not yet had an opportunity to develop a substantial
relationship, is entitled to "maximum protection" of his relationship
with the child.55 The court stated that this protection attached if the
unwed father promptly availed himself of any mechanisms for forming
a legal and emotional bond with the child. 6
The Raquel court dealt with two similar cases both involving
mothers who placed their newborn children up for adoption before the
unwed fathers had the opportunity to develop significant relationships
with the infants.57 The court found that the New York statute, which
required an unwed father to live with his newborn baby's mother in
order to earn the right to veto the adoption of his child, was unconsti-
tutional.58 The court concluded that the State could not establish a
system whereby the mother could unilaterally prevent the father from
attaining constitutional protection by refusing to live with him.59 The
court reasoned that an unwed father has a legal interest in developing a
unwed father's commitment until the legislature redrafted the statute. Id. at 427-28.
The court found that in the case of newborn babies, in order to protect his parental
rights, an unwed father must demonstrate a willingness to assume full custody of his
child, not merely an attempt to block adoption. Id. at 428.
55. Id. at 424.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 419-20. In each case the biological parents did not live together for a
sustained length of time before the mothers placed the children up for adoption. Id. at
420. After the end of the relationships between the biological parents, the mothers
sought adoptive homes for their children. Id. In both cases, the biological parents
reunited soon thereafter, and the mothers supported the fathers' efforts to reclaim their
children. Id.
58. Raquel, 559 N.E.2d at 426-27. The New York statute required that in order for
an unmarried father to qualify for a veto right over the adoption of his under six-month-
old child, the father must (1) have openly lived with the child or the mother for six
months before the child was placed up for adoption, (2) have publicly acknowledged his
paternity during the six month period, and (3) have paid the pregnancy and birth ex-
penses. Id. at 419. The statute thus permitted the child's mother to block an unwed
father's protection of his parental rights by refusing to live with him. Id. at 426. The
statute permitted adoption "despite the father's prompt objection even when he
wishe[d] to form or ... attempted to form a relationship with the infant that would
satisfy the State as substantial, continuous and meaningful by any other standard." The
Raquel court held that the statutory provision violated the unwed father's constitu-
tional right to equal protection. Id. at 427. The court concluded that the legislature
would not have intended the remaining two statutory requirements to stand alone as the
only measure of an unwed father's required commitment to his child, thus entitling him
to veto the adoption of his child. Id. Consequently, the court declared the entire sec-
tion unconstitutional. Id.
59. Id. at 426. The court found that the "living together" requirement added noth-
ing to further the State's objective of ensuring the well-being of illegitimate children
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relationship with his infant.' ° The unwed father who has demon-
strated that he is willing to assume full responsibility for his newborn
child has an interest equal to that of the child's mother in preventing
the termination of his parental rights.61 Because the New York statute
treated unwed fathers differently from mothers, the court found that
the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.62
In California, courts have followed the Lehr Court's literal analysis
and found that only a "presumed father," as defined under California
law, has the ability to veto an adoption.63 Thus, if the child's mother
prevented the child's father from having a meaningful relationship with
his child, the father could totally be denied his rights. In Adoption of
Kelsey S. ," the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
constitutional rights of unwed fathers who are prevented from attain-
ing "presumed" status.6" The court rejected prior California courts'
interpretations of the requirements necessary to achieve presumed fa-
ther status, and instead followed the New York Court of Appeals' lead
in expanding the rights of unwed fathers.66 The court held that a stat-
because the statute focused on the relationship between the unwed father and the unwed
mother, rather than on the relationship between the father and the child. Id.
60. The court expanded the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lehr by concluding that
"the biological connection between the father and child requires the State to allow the
unwed father an 'opportunity' to demonstrate his commitment to a newborn." Recent
Development, supra note 52, at 802.
61. Raquel, 559 N.E.2d at 424. The court found that protection of an unwed fa-
ther's interest requires that he both be a father (biologically) and behave like one. Id.
In the case of a child placed up for adoption at birth, the father has nothing more than a
biological tie to the child. He has no opportunity to establish the relationship necessary
to protect his parental rights.
62. Id. at 426-27.
63. See supra note 10 for the definition of a presumed father. See also W.E.J. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (hold-
ing that a biological father who had never attempted to marry the mother and who had
never taken the child into his home did not fall within the statutory definition of "pre-
sumed father" and therefore his consent was not necessary for adoption).
64. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
65. Id. at 1219. The court also examined whether "constructive receipt" of a child
would suffice under California law to qualify a natural, unwed father as a "presumed
father." The court concluded that only actual receipt, and not constructive receipt, of
the child into the home of the father would qualify the father as a presumed father
under California law. Id. at 1220-23.
66. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text for an analysis of the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in In re Raquel Marie X. The court's holding in Kelsey is
broader than that in Raquel. Raquel involved the adoption of a newborn when the
mother placed the child up for adoption before the father could establish a relationship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol44/iss1/7
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS
ute violated an unwed father's constitutional rights if it enabled a
child's mother to unilaterally preclude him from obtaining the same
legal rights as a presumed father and consequently frustrated his ability
to withhold his consent to the adoption of his child.67
The Kelsey court found that the California statute violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.68 The court examined whether the mother's ability to determine
the father's rights substantially served an important governmental in
terest. 69 The court acknowledged the importance of the State's interest
to provide for the well-being of illegitimate children. 0 However, the
court determined that the statutory treatment of unwed fathers, that is
those without "presumed" status, did not advance that objective.71
The court reasoned that California's system led to irrational distinc-
with the child; thus, the mother prevented the child's father from reaching presumed
status. In comparison, the holding in Kelsey applies any time circumstances beyond the
control of the unwed father prevent him from establishing a meaningful relationship
with his child.
67. Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1236. Under the California statute, a father may become a
presumed father if he has the child at home and holds out the child as his own. Id. at
1220. This is primarily within the control of the child's mother. The mother can deny
the father the right to come into her home or to take the child into his home. The
father's only other recourse is to seek a court order granting him custody. The court
found that this requirement violates the father's Fourteenth Amendment rights. See
infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text for the court's reasoning.
68. Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1233. In examining the unwed father's due process and
equal protection claims, the court explored whether California's sex-based statutory dis-
tinction between mothers and fathers serves an important state interest and is substan-
tially related to the achievement of this interest. Id. at 1233-36.
69. Id. at 1233.
70. Id. at 1234. The court stated that it "cannot conclude in the abstract that adop-
tion is itself a sufficient objective to allow the state to take whatever measures it deems
appropriate." Id. at 1234. The court explained that it could not assume that adoption
is necessarily in a child's best interest. Id. First, the court noted that 7.7% of recent
adoptions are to single parents; therefore, the assumption that an adoption will place an
illegitimate child in a stable two-parent home is not accurate. Id. Furthermore, the
court found the State's logic flawed because the statute seems to suggest that adoption is
more likely to be in the best interest of a child than being in the custody of a single,
biological father. Id. But the statute presupposes that custody by a single, biological
mother better serves the interests of the child than adoptive parents. Id.
71. Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1233-34. The court found that the State's interest in the
statutory distinction between unwed mothers and fathers was to facilitate adoptions.
Id. at 1234. Although the consent of both parents is presumably more difficult to obtain
than the consent of the mother alone, the court rejected this reasoning as unsound and
found that a father was no less likely than a mother to consent to the adoption of his
child. Id.
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tions 2 and prevented a fit biological father from establishing a substan-
tial relationship with his child.7" Absent a showing of the unwed
father's unfitness, the court found that the best interest of a child
placed for adoption was to remain with its only other biological parent
when that parent has demonstrated a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities.74
In a separate opinion, Judge Mosk concurred with the portion of the
Kelsey decision that found that an unwed father under the particular
circumstances has a right to withhold his consent to his child's adop-
tion.7 5 Mosk dissented, however, as to the majority's decision to
render the California statute invalid.7 6 Instead of declaring it unconsti-
tutional, Mosk argued that the court should have avoided the issue of
constitutionality and instead used the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
prevent the mother from benefiting from conduct designed to frustrate
a just result.7
72. Id. at 1235. The court noted several irrational distinctions: (1) the State may
terminate the parental rights of a father who is willing and able to take custody of his
child merely by showing that the adoption would serve a child's interest; yet, a mother
may be unwilling and unable to assume her parental responsibilities, but the court may
only terminate her parental rights with her consent or with a showing of her unfitness as
a parent; and (2) based solely on the wishes of an illegitimate child's mother, a model
father may be denied presumed father status, while a mother may allow a father of
questionable character to assume responsibility for their child, thus permitting the fa-
ther to reach presumed status. Id. at 1235-36.
73. Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1236. The court reiterated the finding in Lehr, 463 U.S.
248, 262 (1983), that the relationship between a natural parent and child is unique
among all relationships the child will have in its life. Id. From that premise the court
concluded that "[i]t therefore would be curious to conclude that the child's best interest
is served by allowing the one parent (the mother) who wants to sever her legal ties to
decide unilaterally that the only other such tie (the father's) will be cut as well." Kelsey,
823 P.2d at 1236.
74. Id. The court conditioned its holding on the father's prompt attempt to assume
his parental responsibilities. Id.
75. Id. at 1239. The dissent considered the majority's result fair. Judge Mosk felt
that an unwed father who was prevented from establishing a relationship with his child
should be entitled to withhold his consent to the adoption of his child when the facts are
similar to those in Kelsey. However, Judge Mosk emphasized that the court should
make such a determination only if these unique factual circumstances are established by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
76. Id. Judge Mosk emphasized that courts should not consider constitutional
questions unless absolutely required. Id. The majority, he felt, declared the statute
unconstitutional unnecessarily. Id.
77. Id. at 1239-40. Judge Mask stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could
be applied to estop an unwed mother or the proposed adoptive parents from denying
that a natural father had reached presumed status. Id. at 1239.
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The Kelsey court reached the correct result for several reasons.
First, the court aptly noted that the rights of unwed fathers who seize
their parental responsibilities are as important as the rights of
mothers.7" The court properly found that when a father attempts to
assume responsibility for his child, the State may not allow the actions
of the child's mother to unilaterally preclude the father from becoming
a presumed father.7 9 The court appropriately rejected the line of cases
that determine the rights of an unwed father solely based on whether
the father succeeded in establishing a relationship with his child."0 In-
stead, the court's better-reasoned view acknowledges that a father's
prompt attempt to assume his parental responsibilities entitles the fa-
ther's parental rights to the same protection afforded the child's
mother's.
Furthermore, the Kelsey decision is correct in recognizing a pre-
sumption that placement in the custody of a biological father is in a
child's best interest when the unwed father makes an effort to establish
a relationship with the child."1 As a result, Kelsey allows a child to
remain with its natural parent. The court correctly decided that it is
not within the judiciary's discretion to sever the unique bond between a
child and its natural father simply because the child's mother, a parent
who is relinquishing her own parental rights, decides the court should
terminate the father's rights. 2
The Kelsey court properly gives an unwed father's parental rights
constitutional protection. By rejecting the requirement that an unwed
father essentially have the cooperation of his child's mother in order to
keep his right to veto his child's adoption, the court reaffirms unwed
fathers' right to due process and equal protection. Other jurisdictions
78. See Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1236.
79. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text for the court's reasoning.
80. See, e.g., In re W.E.J. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 160 Cal. Rptr.
862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that an unwed father did not fall within the statutory
category of "presumed father" because he never married the mother nor took the child
into his home); Adoption of Marie R., 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that a mother may, by her conduct, prevent a natural father from becoming a "pre-
sumed father").
81. See Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1236. See also supra note 72-74 and accompanying text
discussing the court's analysis.
82. See Kelsey, 823 P.2d at 1236. See also supra note 73 explaining the biological tie
and the unfairness of permitting a mother to sever that relationship.
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should focus on the sound reasoning of Kelsey and acknowledge the
important parental rights of unwed fathers.
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